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NOTES
LOCOMOTION, LIBERTY AND LEGISLATION
SCOPE
The infirmities of the Montana vagrancy statute1 are so clear that
anyone advocating its enforcement should be embarrassed. Yet, this
is the position the Montana Chamber of Commerce has taken. It is
possible that the Chamber, which is now advocating its application to
protect "invaded communities and property owners''2 from hippies,
has provided the impetus for its revision. It is apropos that the Cham-
ber's inference was that prosecution for vagrancy could be employed
as a scare device against undesirables. "Most of the hippies do not
want to get involved with the law for various reasons. . . . If they
move on, the case could be dropped.' ' 3 It is this selective application
against minority, under-privileged and socially undesirable groups of
people that has caused this type of statute to be declared invalid.
The Montana vagrancy statute has never been reviewed on appeal.
Therefore, a review of some California decisions is presented for pur-
poses of discussion and background information. The Montana statute
and several city ordinances can be analyzed in light of these decisions
and a number of recent federal court decisions. Legislation in line
with the public property and personal liberty dictates of the United
States courts will be suggested.
HISTORIC GLIMPSE
The concept of vagrancy is not new. The first recorded English
vagrancy law was the Statute of Labourers.4 No doubt it was con-
siderably easier to require adherence to such a statute when society
was agrarian, twenty miles was a day's travel, and governing was by
the caste system. In those days a person's class or status dictated the
privileges he could enjoy. According to the statute,5 if one belonged
to the working class and refused to work, he could be sent to jail until
such time as he found someone to work for him or returned to work
himself. The crime was one of condition or status - being of the work-
ing class and being idle. The needs of the King in 1349 and the liberty
enjoyed by his subjects were considerably different from the needs
and liberty of a Democratic society under the Constitution of the United
States in 1971.
'Revised Codes of Montana, § 94-35-248 (1947) [hereinafter cited as R.C.M. 1947]
R.C.M. 1947, § 11-936. This section gives the cities and town councils power to
define, restrain and punish vagrants. In response to this authorization, ordinances
almost identical to the state statute have been enacted.
'Hippies-Hello &. Goodbye, THE MONTANA CITIZEN 10 (April, 1971) [Published
Monthly by the Montana Chamber of Commerce].
sid.
'23 Edw. III (1349) (repealed Statute Law Revision 1863).
sId.
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However, changes were made in interpretation of the statute as the
English society became more mobile, and different reasons for appli-
cation became apparent.6 People that desired not to work but yet
remained in their own county were no longer prosecuted for being idle.'
Those that did travel from place to place were deemed vagabonds8 or
tramps. These individuals were often undesirable because they tended
to be professional beggars, swindlers or gamblers. 1 The public as-
sociated them with the criminal element. It is in this context that the
vagrancy concept was brought to the United States.
THE VAGRANCY STATUTE UPHELD
In the early 1900's (long before the Warren court clarified the
meaning of due process and fundamental liberty) advocates argued that
vagrancy and loitering statutes were vague. One of these cases, Ex parte
McCue," involved a statute' which provided: "Every idle or lewd
or dissolute person, or associate of known thieves . . . is a vagrant."
The California court rejected the due process argument and held' 3 that
any practice that tends to weaken or corrupt the morals of those engaged
in it is a proper subject to be governed by the police power of the
state. Although the court recognized that a constitutional right to
due process existed, it declared that such right could not render in-
effective laws which are generally admitted to be essential to the safety
and well-being of society.' 4 The court stated:
One charged, as was petitioner, with being an idle, lewd, and dis-
solute person, is sufficiently advised of the character of the offense.
To say that the Legislature must specify the many evils and corrupt
practices which might constitute one a lewd or dissolute person would
often render the enforcement of a police regulation in connection
therewith impossible, and this without considering the indelicacy and
impropriety of expression which would often be necessary."i
However, the court in the McCue case left the door ajar for later attacks.
The court in dicta added that the Legislature could not competently
denounce mere idleness as a crime without some qualification.'i Lewd
and dissolute, however, were thought to be sufficiently clear.
17
6PERKINS, PERKINS ON CRIMINAL LAW at 428 (2nd ed. 1969).
7Id.
8WFmSTIR's THIRD NEW WORLD DICTIONARY (2528) defines a vagabond as "one who
wanders from place to place with no fixed dwelling or if he has one not abiding in
it and who is without visible means of support.-
9PERKINS, supra note 6.
lOld.
UEx parte McCue, 17 Cal. App. 765, 96 P. 110 (1908).
12Cal. Pen. Code § 647 (1872) (as amended 1903) (repealed stats. 1961, c. 560 p. 1672§ 1).
"
3 Ex parte McCue, supra note 11 at 111.
"Id.
15 Id.
'OId.
17In State v. Harlowe, 174 Wash. 227, 24 P.2d 601 (1933), the court was faced with a
[Vol. 32
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Because the void for vagueness argument failed to obtain relief,
a different attack was tried in 1934.18 In Cutler, the petitioner made
a three-pronged attack 9 on the statute2 0 claiming that it was too broad,
that is should be strictly construed in favor of a citizen's liberty, and
that roaming, loafing and idling are not wrongful acts per se and
the prohibition of such acts seriously infringes on the individual's right
of liberty. The California court denied the petition, stating that the
purpose of the statute was "to curb the wandering propensities of
individuals who might offer a menace to the peace and well-being of
society in any locality whereto they might repair." 21 The court further
stated that the well-disposed and orderly citizen needed protection from
the depredations of the idle and vicious. 22 The court held that point-
less and useless wandering from place to place within the state with-
out any excuse was the very kind of conduct that the statute was
aimed at controlling. McCue was distinguished with the simple state-
ment 23 that roaming was not the same thing as idling and the "ad-
ditional qualification" required by McCue was met by the language "with-
out any lawful purpose. " 24 It would seem that the crack in the door
purposefully left by McCue was now closed; at least it was closed in
California and several other states.
25
THE CRACK REOPENS
In 1931 the Federal court of the Ninth Circuit, in Territory of
Hawaii v. Anduha,'2 6 reviewed the vagrancy statute27 of the Territory
of Hawaii. The court cited McCue in support of its position and de-
clared the statute to be unconstitutional because it was too broad.
In any view we take of it, the act trenches upon the inalienable
rights of the citizen to do what he will and when he will, so long
as his course of conduct is not inimical to himself or to the general
public of which he is a part.'
similar statute and quoted almost the entire opinion in McCue. In its own language
the court went to to say that it deemed vagrancy parasitic and if tolerated "would
sap the very life upon which it feeds." The court held that although the terms
"lewd, disorderly and dissolute" had no statutory definition, they are of common
and general use and easily understood by those of average intelligence.
"Ex parte Cutler, 1 Cal. App.2d 273, 36 P.2d 441 (1934).
'OId. at 442.
"Cal. Pen. Code § 647(3) (1872) (as amended 1931) (repealed stats. 1961, c. 560
p. 1672 § 1).
nEx parte Cutler, supra note 18 at 444.
21Id.
=Id.
AId.
"Id. at 445. City of Portland v. Goodwin, 210 P.2d 577, 187 Ore. 409 (1949); Beail
v. District of Columbia, 82 A.2d 756 (D.C. 1951); Fenster v. Criminal Court of
City of New York, 259 N.Y.S.2d 67, 46 Mise.2d 179 (1965).
"Territory of Hawaii v. Anduha, 48 F.2d 171 (9th Cir. 1931).
7'Session Laws Hawaii 1929, Act 256 § 1. The statute provided that any person who
shall habitually loaf, loiter, and/or idle upon any public street or highway or in
any public place shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
'Anduha, supra note 26 at 173.
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The case has also been cited in support of the void for vagueness doctrine
based upon the following language: "These words idle, loiter, and loaf
have no sinister meaning and imply no wrongdoing or misconduct on
the part of those engaged in the prohibited practices."'29
Probably the greatest significance of Anduha is its language that
discusses and defines 0 some of the personal rights of each citizen. Al-
though declaring that the statute infringed on these liberties, the court
did not indicate from which amendment these rights were derived. It
simply stated that the rights existed before the Constitution and that
they had been made a part of the fundamental law. It can be anticipated
then that Anduha could be used as authority for three different argu-
ments for declaring a vagrancy statute unconstitutional. It is authority
for an attack on the basis of the void for vagueness doctrine. 3' It sup-
ports an attack based on overbreadth, and finally, it helps determine
whether certain kinds of conduct will be protected as a fundamental
liberty.32
Anduha first appeared in a 1938 California decision, Phillips v.
Municipal Court of Los Angeles, 3 but only in the dissenting opinion.
In issue was another subdivision of the vagrancy statute.34 The court
held that it was permissible to use the term loiter in the statute if the
place to be protected was a public school and the people to be protected
"'Id. at 172. "Personal liberty, which is guaranteed to every citizen under our con-
stitution and laws, consists of the right of locomotion-to go where one pleases, and
when, and to do that which may lead to one's business or pleasure, only so far re-
strained as the rights of others may make it necessary for the welfare of all other
citizens. One may travel along the public highways or in public places; and while
conducting themselves in a decent and orderly manner, disturbing no other, and
interfering with the rights of no other citizens, there they will be protected under
the law, not only in their persons, but in their safe conduct. The constitution and
the laws are framed for the public good, and the protection of all citizens, from the
highest to the lowest; and no one may be restrained of his liberty, unless he has
transgressed some law. Any law which would place the keeping and safe conduct
of another in the hands of even a conservator of the peace, unless for some breach
of the peace committed in his presence, or upon suspicion of felony would be most
oppressive and unjust, and destroy all the rights which our constitution guaranties.
These are rights which existed long before our constitution, and we have taken just
pride in their maintenance, making them a part of the fundamental law of the land."
"1Ricks v. District of Columbia, 414 F.2d 1097 (1968). In this case, Anduha was cited
as authority in striking down the District of Columbia vagrancy law. Some discussion
in the case was directed to the chilling effect that a vague statute has on constitu-
tional guaranties. "Since most people shy away from legal violations, personal lib-
erty is unconstitutionally dampened when one can but doubt whether he is actually
free to pursue particular conduct." Ricks, supra at 1101.
This writer is entirely in agreement with this statement. However, the majority
of decisions have been based on the over-breadth doctrine. It may also be easier to
depict the chilling effect when approached from the standpoint of overbreadth. For
these reasons, the preponderance of cases cited will have turned on the basis of the
statute or ordinance being unconstitutionally overbroad.
"Such fundamental rights were not protected against invasion by the States. It was
as if these rights were a Federal common law right to protect the people from inter-
ference of the national government.
"Phillips v. Municipal Court of Los Angeles, 24 Cal. App.2d 453, 75 P.2d 548, 550
(1938).
'Cal. Pen. Code § 647 (1872) (as amended 1931) (repealed stats. 1961, c. 560 p.
1672 § 1).
[Vol, 32
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were children. In dissent, 35  Justice McComb stated that innocuous
conduct cannot be made a criminal offense. 36
Finally, in 1942 in an habeas corpus proceeding3 7 in which petitioner
sought relief from prosecution under a local loitering ordinance38 against
labor pickets, Anduha was cited as authority by Justice Traynor in
declaring the section unconstitutional. The court stated:30
The sweeping prohibition of section 2 would apply equally against
peaceful pickets, shoppers engrossed in a window display, invalids
in wheelchairs, acquaintances who stand engaged in conversation.
The entire section is therefore invalid even though Yuba County
might validly prohibit excessive and unneccessary obstructions of
the streets and highways.
However, the petitioner failed to carry the burden of proof that he
had not been convicted of the one valid provision of the ordinance
prohibiting acts of violence and his petition was denied.
THE DILEMMA
Anduha was not actually raised in issue in California again until
196140 when another section of the vagrancy statute4 ' was challenged
as being vague. The court, striving to find the statute a proper exercise
of power, stated :42
Manifestly one who goes to a bus station or railroad station and
waits for the purpose of buying a ticket, boarding the conveyance,
meeting a relative or friend actually expected to arrive, or with
"Phillips, supra note 33 at 549-50.
"Phillips was followed in State v. Starr, 57 Ariz. 270, 113 P.2d 356 (1941), which
also involved loitering near a public school. The court there distinguished Anduha
and stated that it applied to public streets, highways and public places. "Public
school grounds and premises are not free to any and everyone like a public street
or highway or public park. Public school grounds and premises are dedicated to the
use of persons eligible to attend the schools, their officers, teachers and employees.
Others entering are invitees or licensees or trespassers and subject to the rules of
law applicable to their situation." Starr, supra at 358-59. The court ignored the
fact that petitioners were not on the school grounds, but rather had been arrested
for loitering within three hundred feets of the grounds, a statutory offense. The
real issue therefore was not whether trespassing on the school grounds could be
proscribed, but whether loitering within three hundred feet of a public school could
be prohibited.
'Ex parte Bell, 19 C.2d 488, 122 P.2d 22 (1942).
'Yuba County, California, Ordinance § 2-It is unlawful for any person to loiter,
stand or sit upon any public highway, alley, sidewalk or crosswalk so as to in any
manner hinder or obstruct the free passage therein or thereon of persons or vehicles
passing or attempting to pass along the same, or so as to in any manner annoy or
molest persons passing along the same.
"Exp parte Bell, supra note 37 at 28.
'In re Cregler, 14 Cal. Rptr. 289, 363 P.2d 305 (1961). The court held that pro-
hibiting loitering in bus stations by a person who had been convicted of being a
thief was not unconstitutionally vague and indefinite. This holding was reminiscent
of Phillips where the place was a school and the people specifically protected were
children. Although this writer does not agree with either holding, he does see a dis-
tinguishable difference between legislation that would protect children and legisla-
tion that would continue to penalize ex-convicts.
"Cal. Pen. Code § 647(4) (West 1955) (repealed stats, 1961, c. 560 p. 1672 § 1).
" n re Cregler, supra note 40 at 307.
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any other legitimate objective, is not loitering within the sense of
the statute. Loitering as forbidden includes waiting, but mere
waiting for any lawful purpose does not constitute loitering.
The court further stated that loitering has a sinister 3 or wrongful, as
well as a reasonably definite, implication. The word, as used in the
statute, "obviously connotes lingering in the designated place for the
purpose of committing a crime as opportunity may be discovered." 44
The court used Phillips v. Municipal Court45 as authority. In light of
the rule of Phillips and the presumption of validity that any statute is
permitted, the court stated that the rules of In re Bell,40 In re McCue 4
and Territory of Hawaii v. Anduha46 will not be discussed.
Looking at the state of the law in Caliorni ten years ago, three
things are reasonably clear. Certain public areas could be declared
off limits, and citizens found within that vicinity could be declared
vagrants. Citizens who had been convicted of, or who confessed to,
being pickpockets or burglars and had no visible means of support
could be declared vagrants and duly prosecuted. Finally, loitering was
defined in California to mean lingering in a designated place apparent-
ly awaiting an opportunity to commit a crime. But the California
position was typical of the position of most of the states. In retrospect,
it appears that the situation had changed very little from the time
the Statute of Labourers was enacted. Instead of unemployed members
of the working class, suspicious persons or persons, simply in the wrong
place at the wrong time, were subject to prosecution.
THE PRIVILEGE
In 1940 Mr. Justice Murphy stated49 that some of the freedoms
set forth in the First Amendment were among the fundamental liberties
secured to all persons by the Fourteenth Amendment. In 196350 it be-
came clear that such fundamental freedom included the right to petition
for the redress of grievances. Although it was decided as long ago
as 18195' that the Constitution was not to be narrowly construed, it
was not until 1965 in Griswold v. Connecticut52 that life and substance
were given to the guarantees set forth in the Bill of Rights. Reading
Anduha in light of Griswold, one of the liberties guaranteed to all per-
sons in the United States is the right of locomotion. When Anduha was
decided it, of course, limited only interference by the Federal govern-
4Id.
"Phillips v. Municipal Court, 24 Cal. App.2d 453, 75 P.2d 548 (1938).
"In re Bell, 19 C.2d 488, 122 P.2d 22 (1942).
1TIn re McCue, 17 Cal. App. 765, 96 P. 110 (1908).
4
'Anduha, supra note 26.
"Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95 (1940).
"°Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963).
"McCullock v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
[Vol. 32
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ment. Griswold causes A'nduha to be read as a guarantee against inter-
ference by the States. It is not to be contended that such a freedom
is absolute. The States and municipalities have the power to establish
rules of order for the safety of, and to enhance the liberty of, all
citizens;53 but individuals are free to go about the public streets and
places of a city so long as their concerns are lawful.5 4
At the time of this writing, no loitering or vagrancy statute has
been before the United States Supreme Court. It is unlikely that any
statute drafted in the traditional language will ever reach that court. 55
There are a number of decisions from the lower Federal courts in re-
cent years declaring these statutes unconstitutional. These are worthy
of consideration for their application of constitutional principles.
THE PRIVILEGE APPLIED IN THE SIXTIES
In 1967 the Kentucky vagrancy statute and the Louisville loitering
ordinance were challenged as vague and overbroad. 56 These two laws5
7
were drafted in terms of able-bodied persons failing to seek or accept
work or loitering about public places and failing to give a satisfactory
account of themselves. In striking down the loitering ordinance, the
court cited Anduha as authority. "Failing to give a satisfactory account
of oneself," 58 it was held, gives unlimited discretion to a police officer
to determine what is satisfactory. In declaring the vagrancy statute to
be unconstitutional, the United States District Court declared that the
statute was strictly a catch-all statute failing in specifics. Allowing it-
self a candid observation, the court commented 9 that such a statute
might have been loosely drawn intentionally to trap those felt to be
undesirable. The court then firmly declared"0 that movement is es-
sential to freedom, and property status, that is, a person's livelihood,
is not to be a determining factor of the rights of citizenship.
"Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965). ". . . specific guarantees in the
Bill of Rights have penumbras formed by emanations from those guarantees that
help give them life and substance.''
53Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941). 'Civil liberties, as guaranteed
by the Constitution, imply the existence of an organized society maintaining public
order without which liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of unrestrained abuses.
The authority of a municipality to impose regulations ... has never been regarded
as inconsistent with civil liberties, but rather as one of the means of safeguarding
the good order upon which they ultimately depend."
"Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87 (1965).
15United States v. Kilgen, 431 F.2d 627, 631 (5th Cir. 1970). ,'... we think it border-
ing on the fantastic to contend that everything listed in this relic of the English
Statutes of Laborers can come within the power of the state to forbid, with criminal
sanctions in this day.''
'Baker v. Bindner, 274 F. Supp. 658 (D. Ky. 1967).
'
7Baldwin's Kentucky Revised Statutes § 436.520 Vagrancy (1969); Louisville, Ky.,
Ordinance 525.01(a), Loitering and Related Offenses.
'Baker, supra note 56 at 664.
0Id. at 662.
wId.
.1971]
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On the basis of Robinson v. State of California,"' criminal laws must
be directed toward actions and not personal status. A person can not
be arrested on the basis of suspicion or even probable cause to believe
that he is a narcotics addict, homosexual, indigent or is dissolute.6 2 In
Hughes v. Rizzo 3 the court determined that the reason for the arrest
of a number of young people was to rid a public park of undesirables,
specifically "hippies". This kind of struggle between society, i.e.,
"the establishment", and those groups of people thought to be undesir-
able is an historic one. Nonetheless, a state's police power cannot be
used to "suppress one class of idlers in order to make a place more
attractive to other idlers of a more desirable class. "'64
Goldman v. Knecht,65 a case from the Federal District Court of
Colorado, is of particular interest, since the vagrancy statute66 was
examined in detail and the alleged violators were of the class designated
as "hippies".67 Two arrests were made under the statute. The first
arrest, made at a basement apartment, resulted in a prosecution before
this injunctive action was initiated. Ten people were arrested and all
but the two plaintiffs were released. The second arrest under the same
statute was made while trial was pending on charges resulting from the
first arrest. The police again released some of those arrested, but deter-
mined that the plaintiffs and eight of their companions should be held.
This second arrest took place at a mountain campsite in conjunction with
the execution of a narcotics search warrant. None of the narcotics
foulI could 'e Iinieu to the plainiffs. IlI 10l.4lfl 5  htih..
had been revised in 1963, was loosely drafted in terms of loitering or
strolling about, frequenting public places and leading an immoral and
profligate life. The court declared68 that the regulation was concerned
with the person rather than his behavior and thus potentially subjected
"'Robinson v. State of California, 370 U.S. 660 (1961).
"Hughes v. Rizzo, 282 F. Supp. 881, 884 (E.D. Penn. 1968).
3Id. This was an action under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, to restrain
officials from harassing the plaintiffs.
"Anduha, supra note 26 at 173; Goldman v. Knecht, 295 F. Supp. 897, 902 (D. Colo.
1969). "Initially vagrancy was conceived as an economic measure which sought to
shore up the crumbling structure of feudal society by prohibiting mobility among the
laboring class. Vagrancy statutes were subsequently used in the post-feudal society
as a means of protecting a local community from the financial burdens and poten-
tial criminality of undesirable strangers."
"Goldman v. Knecht, supra note 64.
wColorado Revised Statutes § 40-8-19 (1963).
'TPeople v. Coulon, 78 Cal. Rptr. 95, 98 (1969), recognized the term as adequate for
group identification. "Hippie has wide currency as a description of a contemporary
social phenomenon. The term denotes an unconventional young person in rebellion
against competitive middle-class values, who usually consorts with his own kind and
tends to symbolize his rebellion by hirsuteness and picturesque garb. As a group
description, it signifies persons sharing a limited set of common characteristics. In
college communities many students adopt the external appearance of hippies, making
the term dubious as a physical identification. In a rural area such as Siskiyou
County common sense and judicial notice combine to permit recognition of the term
as a generalized description of external appearance, adequate for the purpose of
group identification. ''
Goldman v. Kneeht, supra note 64 at 904.
[Vol. 32
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every able-bodied citizen of Colorado to criminal penalty for doing in-
herently innocuous acts. Although the court thought this result unlikely,
it held that this fact was indicative of the wide range of conditions that
could be grounds for prosecution. Therefore, if the statute were to be
enforced at all, the persons to be prosecuted would necessarily be selected
arbitrarily at the whim of a policeman. "An enactment which is devoid
of precise definition does not satisfy our basic notion that government
must be by law and not by the whim of man. "9 The statute was found
to be extremely broad and vague and was held in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due process. 70
In Wheeler v. Goodman,71 a group of twelve "hippies" sought in-
junctive and declaratory relief under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to
prevent systematic harassment under the North Carolina vagrancy stat-
ute. 72 The statute was similar to the one in Goldman v. Knecht, i.e,
no means of livelihood, idleness, no visible property, and a profligate
lifestyle. The Charlotte police had arrested plaintiffs fifteen times in
thirty-six days. On one occasion they had even entered the plaintiff's
house on the premise that they had heard profane language. The plain-
tiffs, after being fingerprinted and photographed, were released under
a "nolle prosequi with leave. ' ' 73 Citing Baker v. Bindner74 as authority,
the court struck down the statute, declaring it to be a catch-all and an
infringement of the plaintiffs' constitutional rights. The court stated :75
Freedom to conform to community behavior patterns is not liberty,
but state regimentation. There can never be total freedom of action
for the individual, since behavior that is harmful to others cannot
be permitted. But toleration of nonconformity is the test of a mature
strong government. In the United States belief and noninjurious
behavior are not punishable. A man is free to be a hippie, a
Methodist, a Jew, a Black Panther, a Kiawanian, or even a Com-
munist, so long as his conduct does not imperil others, or infringe
upon their rights. In short, it is no crime to be a hippie.
wId. at 906.
'The court also held that the statute denied equal protection. It is the only case
found which reached that conclusion.
nWheeler v. Goodman, 306 F. Supp. 58 (D. N.C. 1969).
"'General Statutes of North Carolina § 14-336.
"
3Wheeler v. Goodman, supra note 71 at 60. This action is similar to that being advo-
cated by the Montana Chamber of Commerce. However, such procedure is clearly
not a proper exercise of power. In Menard v. Mitrhell, 430 F.2d 486, 493-94 (D.C.
Cir. 1970) it was said: "Many individuals have unjustly acquired arrest records . ..
In the District of Columbia alone, literally thousands of persons were once arrested
for 'investigation' and then released; but their records often remain. Dragnet ar-
rests are at best matters of recent memory. Even worse are those occasions, far
more comman than we would like to think, where invocation of the criminal process
is used-often with no hope of ultimate conviction-as punitive sanction. Hippies
and civil rights workers have been harassed and literally driven from their houses
by repeated and unlawful arrests, often made under statutes unconstitutional on
their face. Innocent bystanders may be swept up in mass arrests made to clear the
streets either during a riot or during lawful political demonstrations. Use of the
power to arrest in order to inflict summary punishment is, of course, unconstitu-
tional . ... 1
"Baker v. Bindner, supra note 56. Specifically on the facts of this case the First,
Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment privileges were in issue.
Wheeler v. Goodman, supra note 71 at 62.
1971]
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The argument that the vagrancy statute can be used effectively as
a deterrent to crime was argued in Wheeler v. Goodman just as it has
been argued over the years. The court met that argument by saying
that, just as certain liberties are not absolutes, neither is crime pre-
vention an absolute value.
76
Methods of prevention are constantly weighed against the personal
liberties enshrined in the Constitution. Here the outrageous police
action under color of the vagrancy statute is far too high a price
to pay for crime prevention.'
The use of such a statute to arrest in order to harass or even inflict sum-
mary punishment is blatantly unconstitutional.
78
The final case79 that is to be reviewed herein brought the Salt Lake
City vagrancy ordinance.80 into question. That ordinance is almost
identical with the Montana vagrancy statute.81 The plaintiff had been
arrested for vagrancy and loitering and confined for twelve hours in
the city jail. Several months later the complaint against him was simply
dismissed. Since the plaintiff intended to remain in the city, he in-
stituted an action to have the statute declared unconstitutional so he
would not have to live in fear of it being applied to him again. The
court held8 2 that the statute would chill the liberty of lawful movement,
presence, and physical status. It declared the following three sections
to be unconstitutional :s
(1) A vagrant is every person (except an Indian) without visible
means of support who has the physical ability to work, and who
does not seek employment, nor labor when employment is offered
to him; or
(3) Every person who roams about from place to place without
any lawful business; or
(6) Every person who wanders about the street at late or
unusual hours of the night, without any visible or lawful busi-
ness; . . .
The court refrained from passing on the other provisions of the ordi-
nance.
It becomes clear then that, as the privileges that a citizen of
these United States enjoys have become more clearly defined and under-
stood, the doctrine of due process has required broader application.
Although the freedom of locomotion is not absolute, it certainly is
"'Id. at 65.
T7Id.
,'See quoted material, supra note 73.
9Decker v. Fillis, 306 F. Supp. 613 (D. Utah 1969).
08Salt Lake City Ordinance, § 32-1-6.
-R.C.M. 1947, § 94-35-248.82Decker, supra note 79 at 617.
[Vol. 32
10
Montana Law Review, Vol. 32 [1971], Iss. 2, Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol32/iss2/6
NOTES
fundamental; being fundamental it must receive appropriate protection. 4
This is not to say that the states no longer have the power to legislate
to protect the interests of the majority of its citizens.8 5 However, such
legislation must be drafted so as to protect the rights of the citizens
as a whole, with an absolute minimal erosion of the rights of the citizen
as an individual.
86
LEGISLATION FOR THE SEVENTIES AND BEYOND
The problems that a state undergoes as it prepares legislation in
an area in which a fundamental liberty is involved are extensive. Laws
based on bias, prejudice, moral convictions and religious beliefs, the
motivating forces for much of the legislation declared unconstitutional
in the last ten years, will no longer be tolerated.
The man who goes either by himself or with his family to a public
place must expect to meet and mingle with all classes of people.
He cannot ask, to suit his caprice or prejudice or social views, that
this or that man shall be excluded because he does not wish to
associate with them. He may draw his social line as closely as
he chooses at his home, or in other private places, but he cannot
in a public place carry the privacy of his home with him, or ask
that people not as good or great as he is shall step aside when
he appears.'
Drafters must clearly define the objective which the statute is intend-
ed to attain.88  The majority of the citizens of a state cannot legislate
standards of moral conduct for its citizens unless the conduct to be
prohibited is patently offensive to "reasonable thinking" citizens. It
is clearly within the power of the state to prohibit public fornication,
loud and abusive noises, insulting and provocative language, and ob-
struction of public passages.
Another of the bases for vagrancy statutes has been the concern
that people in unusual places at unusual times are there for criminal
purposes.8 9  This fear has often been proved valid. Statutes properly
drafted to control such objectionable conduct are valid. Assuming that
"Fenster v. Leary, 282 N.Y.S.2d 739, 229 N.E.2d 426, 428 (1967). Quoting Judge
Fuld in an earlier case the court stated: "The police power is 'very broad and com-
prehensive' and in its exerice the conduct of an individual and the use of property
may be regulated so as to interfere, to some extent, with the freedom of the one and
the enjoyment of the other .... But, in order for an exercise of the police power
to be valid, there must be 'some fair, just and reasonable connection' between it
and the promotion of the health, comfort, safety and welfare of society."
"Cox v. New Hampshire, supra note 53.
"See quoted material, supra note 84.
6"In re Gox, 90 Cal. Rptr. 24, 474 P.2d 992, 1005 (1970) gives credit for this quote
to the Michigan Supreme Court in Ferguson v. Giles, 82 Mich. 358, 46 N.W. 718
(1890).
"This writer would discourage the mere copying of legislation from other states,
particularly in areas in which fundamental liberties are involved. Statutes of other
states will be examined infra for purposes of example and illustration of what type
of statute may be permissible.
'Goldman v. Knecht, supra note 64 at 902. This law has been used since the 14th
century to advance economic, social and moral objectives, prohibit mobility among
serfs, and to protect communities from the financial burdens and potential criminality
of undesirable strangers.
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the state desires to control public loitering to the extent that it is affect-
ing or is about to affect the rights of other members of society, what
kind of legislation is permissible?
One guide that is available, other than case law research, is the
American Law Institute's Model Penal Code, Section 250.6.90 The Model
Act sets forth two criteria that must be met before a person may be
arrested for loitering. First, the time, place or manner in which the
loitering occurs must be unusual for law-abiding citizens. Second, the
circumstances under which the act occurs must be such as to warrant
alarm for the safety of either persons or property in the vicinity. Should
the actor flee upon sight of the officer, refuse to identify himself, or
attempt to hide himself from the officer, such officer may consider these
circumstances in determining whether alarm is justified. However,
the person must be afforded an opportunity to dispel any alarm which
the police officer has relied upon in making the arrest.
A New York court was faced with a statute based on a prior draft
of this Model Penal Code in People v. Beltrand.91 Subdivision 6, Section
240.35 of the New York Penal Law states :92
A person is guilty of loitering when he . . . Loiters, remains or
wanders in or about a place without apparent reason and under
circumstances which justify suspicion that he may be engaged or
about to engage in crime, and upon inquiry by a peace officer, re-
fuses to identify himself or fails to give a reasonably credible ac-
count of his conduct and purposes.
The court pointed out that there are two elements to the crime. Element
number one, "loitering without apparent reason," was unconstitutional
for the same reasons as the statute in Anduha, i.e., the statute unreason-
ably interfered with a person's freedom of locomotion.9 3 Element number
two, "under circumstances which justify suspicion," was declared un-
constitutional due to interference with a person's Fourth Amendment
rights.9 4 Loitering had not been limited 95 as suggested by the proposed
Model Act "under circumstances that warrant alarm for the safety of
persons or property in the vicinity. '"96 A statute which "fails to dis-
tinguish between innocent conduct and action which is calculated to
cause harm may not be sustained.' 97 The substantial changes made in
the final draft to the Model Penal Code as pointed out by the author's
'
0American Law Institute, Model Penal Code Proposed Official Draft, May 4, 1962,
§ 250.6 Loitering or Prowling.
O'People v. Beltrand, 314 N.Y.S.2d 276, 63 Misc.2d 1041 (1970).
"Id. at 280.
93Id.
"Id. The requirement of probable cause, designed to protect Fourth Amendment free-
doms, was not met by the term reasonable suspicion. In fact reasonable suspicion is
the very antithesis of probable cause.
"5Id.
"Model Penal Code, supra note 90.
'TPeople v. Bertrand, supra note 91 at 282.
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comments to that Code persuaded the court that a contrary holding would
be improper.
In one case, 98 a statute,99 drafted in accordance with the suggestions
of the Model Act, was reviewed and the court declared that statute to
be valid. The plaintiff in Camarco v. City of Orange'0 0 pursued a de-
claratory judgment action to have the revised loitering ordinance de-
clared unconstitutional. A prior action against Mr. Camarco under the
former ordinance was dismissed because the statute failed to set forth
norms and standards.101  The court found that loitering per se was
not a crime under the Orange ordinance.10 2 Only loitering as defined
under Section 1 and being practiced so as to infringe on the individual
rights of other citizens was prohibited. 03  Therefore, protected conduct
could not be punished. The court also declared 10 4 that under Section 3
a policeman did not have unlimited discretion since he could not arrest
until after the request to move on had been made; the critical difference
is that no request to move on could be made without a showing that
the loitering was being done in a manner which interfered with the
privileges of another.
The Montana Criminal Law Commission has drafted a proposal l0 5
which includes a new section to replace the present Montana vagrancy
'Camarco v. City of Orange, 111 N.J. Super. 400, 268 A.2d 354 (1970).
9Orange, N.J. City Ordinance §, An Ordinance to Prevent Loitering Within the City
of Orange
Section 1. Definitions. As used in this Section.
(a) ''Loitering" shall mean remaining idle in essentially one location and shall
include concepts of spending time idly, loafing or walking about aimlessly, and shall
include the coloquial [sic] expression ''hanging around."
(b) ''Public place" [unavailable].
Section 2. Certain types of Loitering Prohibited. No person shall loiter in a public
place in such manner as to:
(a) Create or cause to be created a danger of a breach of the peace.
(b)Create or cause to be created any disturbance or annoyance to the comfort and
repose of any person.
(e) Obstruct the free passage of pedestrians or vehicles.
(d) Obstruct, molest, or interfere with any person lawfully in any public place
as defined in Section 1 (b). This paragraph shall include the making of unsolicited
remarks of an offensive, disgusting or insulting nature or which are calculated to
annoy or disturb the person to, or in whose hearing, they are made.
Section 3. Discretion of Police Officer.
Whenever any police officer shall, in the exercise of reasonable judgment, decide
that the presence of any person in any public place is causing or is likely to cause
any of the conditions enumerated in Section 2, he may, if he deems it necessary
for the preservation of the public peace and safety, order that person to leave that
place. Any person who shall refuse to leave after being ordered to do so by a police
officer shall be guilty of a violation of this Section.
11°Camarco, supra note 98.
10LId. at 355.
1021d. at 358.
usId.
'
T Id.
"Proposed Montana Criminal Code of 1970, § 94-8-105 Failure of Suspicious Persons
to Cooperate
(1) Where a person appears in an unusual place or at an unusual hour, and under
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statute. It conforms to the suggestions made by the American Law
Institute's Model Code provision. Perhaps it goes even a few steps
farther in insuring clarification, since it is not drafted in terms of
loitering. Instead, it is drafted in terms of "unusual place" and "unusual
hour" under circumstances creating a "reasonable suspicion" that
the actor "has committed or is about to commit an offense." This
critical language would appear to meet the criteria of probable cause to
arrest dictated by the Fourth Amendment. 10 6 At the same time it ap-
pears to be narrowly drafted and should withstand attacks based on
either vagueness or overbreadth. It certainly could not be successfully
argued that any citizen could be arrested at high noon on the main
street of his city under such a statute. Nor could it be argued that the
average citizen is not made aware of the criteria that constitute the
offense. The English language is capable of explicit drafting, but
laws cannot be so specifically drafted that they are inapplicable in a
variety of circumstances. "Unusual place" and "unusual hour" are
arguably as narrow as necessary to preserve fundamental liberties, yet
as broad as necessary to insure application to differing circumstances.
The hands of the police officer are not tied by the language "under
circumstances creating a reasonable suspicion that he has committed
or is about to commit an offense." However, a great deal of discretion
has been denied that officer. The potentiality for treatment because
of bias has been restricted, but the motivating purpose, preservation of
peace and order and preservation of life and property, is still capable
of accomplishment.
CONCLUSION
In the Fifties and Sixties a number of problems similar to the loiter-
ing and vagrancy situation discussed herein were encountered by our
society. These problems need not have arisen. But it is always easier
to learn from review than it is to observe the day-to-day changes. This
note has attempted to demonstrate by review that the present loitering
and vagrancy statutes and ordinances are not permissible state regulations.
circumstances creating a reasonable suspicion that he has committed or is about to
commit an offense, a peace officer may after identifying himself, order the person
to identify himself and explain his suspicious activity. A person commits the offense
of failure to cooperate if he refuses or knowingly fails to obey such an order.(2) A person convicted of the offense of failure to cooperate shall be fined not
to exceed fifty dollars ($50) or be imprisoned in the county jail for a term not to
exceed five (5) days, or both.
(3) It shall be a defense if a person's refusal to obey such an order proves justified.
Drafters' Comment: This section replaces R.C.M. 94-35-248, Vagrancy. The main
intent of the section is to provide a legitimate means of removing persons from any
place where they might be found under suspicious circumstances. The failure of the
peace officer, especially one without a uniform, to properly identify himself to a
person falling under this provision, is an example of a probable justified refusal
under subsection (3).
101In Beltrand, supra note 91, one of the infirmities of the statute was that it used
the word "suspicion" without qualification. Arguably, reasonable suspicion and
probable cause mean the same thing.However, it would remove a potential attack on
the statute if it were changed to "probable cause to believe" rather than "reason-
able suspicion. '
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Activities that could have been prohibited at one time are no longer
subject to state interference. The easiest explanation for the change is
that, as the fundamental liberties inherent to all persons of this country
have become more clearly defined, the various laws limiting these liberities
have necessarily been invalidated.
This note has been approached from a personal freedom/public
property point of view. What of these same personal freedoms when
they come into contact with the rights of the individual property owner?
What of Montana's problems when, after July 1, 1971, all nineteen-
year-old persons will be given their majority? Will they be allowed
equal access to business premises that heretofore have been closed to
them? What of the politely worded sign that appears in so many busi-
ness establishments in this state, "We reserve the right to refuse service
to anyone?" Can a businessman open his doors only to whomever he
desires? Can the corner grocer sell food to the citizens of the community
and refuse to sell to any tourists, hippies, or persons in uniform? Does
it make a difference that the business premises is a shopping center,
a service station, a jewelry store, a tavern, or a private hospital?
These questions are still unanswered. California has statutorily
declared 107 that all persons within its jurisdiction shall have equal ac-
cess to the services and facilities of all business establishments. 08 A
similar provision may well be a sound proposal for Montana's new state
constitution. It is this writer's conviction that the fundamental liberties
of all persons, exercised insofar as consonant with the use of the property,
should be protected on business premises and similar areas open to the
public which are nevertheless classified as private property. This is the
lesson of the Fifties and Sixties to be applied to legislation for the
Seventies and Beyond.
P. BRUCE HARPER
'Cal. Civ. Code § 51 (West 1954 as amended stats. 1961, c. 1187 p. 2920 § 1). This
section shall be known and may be cited as the Unruh Civil Rights Act. All persons
within the jurisdiction of this State are free and equal and no matter what their
race, color, religion, ancestry or national origin are entitled to the full and equal
accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establish-
ments of every kind whatsoever.
This section shall not be construed to confer any right or privilege on a person
which is conditioned or limited by law or which is applicable alike to persons of every
color, race, religion, ancestry or national origin.
108In Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946), it was stated: "Ownership does
not mean absolute dominion. The more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his
property for use by the public in general, the more do his rights become circumscribed
by the statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it." Amalgamated Food
Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968) is in
accord with Marsh. These cases further state that " . . the State may not delegate
the power, through the use of its trespass laws, wholly to exclude those members of
the public wishing to exercise their First Amendment rights on the premises in a
manner and for a purpose generally consonant with the use to which the property is
actually put. Marsh, supra at 508; Logan Valley Plaza, supra at 319-20.
Reading these two cases together with the Unruh Civil Rights Act, supra note 107,
one could conclude that all fundamental freedoms are protected on business premises
in California insofar as they are 'consonant with the use to which the property is
actually put." Just as it has been shown that loitering in public places is
crime, it follows that requesting service or attempting to make a purchase in a store
could not be penalized under the guise of a trespass statute.
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